Unfinished business: Putting the final touches on the USMCA

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The Hill /  David L. Goldwyn / October 29

 

The proposed US Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA) makes important, but incomplete, progress in securing an integrated North American energy market.

In terms of progress, the agreement preserves zero tariffs for trade in oil, gas and petroleum products across North America. It effectively locks in Mexico’s historic energy reforms by ensuring that Mexico cannot reinstate restrictions on US investment in the oil and gas sector. A “ratchet” clause ensures that if Mexico decides to further liberalize the sector, then that higher floor becomes the new USMCA commitment.

While Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms are weaker, they remain in force for certain “covered sectors,” including oil and gas investments in Mexico and power generation and pipeline investments where the investor has a contract with the government.

These are all positive steps for North American energy security. Mexico and Canada provide the United States with the heavy grades of oil not produced domestically, helping US refineries produce gasoline at the lowest possible cost. Thanks to this relationship,  the United States is an efficient net exporter of petroleum products.

However, while this progress is laudable, it remains incomplete.

In the rush to conclude the agreement, effective protection for power generation investments like new wind and solar plants, refining and natural gas infrastructure, and power transmission lines were left out, perhaps inadvertently. Contracts for these investments are with state owned enterprises (SOEs) like Mexico’s CFE and PEMEX, which do not now fall within the definition of “federal government” because they are not disposing of assets but signing a contract for service. These essential investments, in the gas and refined product infrastructure which carry US products to and through Mexico, transmission lines which carry US electricity south, and investments in power generation are not permitted to bring ISDS claims to enforce their rights.

This is an oversight, and a protection these investments should enjoy. Rather, the proposed agreement creates an uneven playing field as investors who do have a contract with the Federal government, say for exploration, are entitled to bring an ISDS claim for any of their businesses, while those who do not have such contract do not. The problem can be easily fixed by expanding the definition of federal government to include these wholly owned SOEs.

These (for now) unprotected investments are critical to North American energy security. They secure US exports of electricity and natural gas and assure the continued reliability of the North American electricity system. They are the lifelines which carry US exports to Mexico – currently our number one customer for natural gas and petroleum products.

Protecting investments in Mexico’s electricity sector improves US national security by supporting Mexico’s prosperity through a more resilient power system.

Finally, if US power sector investments in Mexico are not protected and thus potentially hindered or lost, China is certain to fill the gap.

Chinese investment in all forms of power generation, transmission, and distribution is rapidly accelerating throughout Latin America. According to a recent Atlantic Council report, cumulative flows of Chinese foreign direct investment in Latin America have reached $110 billion, with $25 billion in oil and gas investment, and $13 billion in electricity, utilities and alternative energy. China’s State Grid has invested $7 billion in Brazil, through a combination of greenfield investments and acquisitions.

If the Mexican government is willing to offer these investments protections (and they are), and create a level playing field for American companies investing in our closest neighbor, the US should not object.

Fortunately, there is still time to correct the definition of eligible claimants as both sides ready the agreement for ratification.  With these modest steps, the United States, Mexico and Canada can improve the resilience of North America’s energy system, and the US can simultaneously advance its economic and national security interests.

David L. Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy and serves as chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center Energy Advisory Group. He served as the U.S. State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs from 2009 to 2011; he previously served as assistant secretary of energy for international affairs and as national security deputy to U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson. He is a member of the U.S. National Petroleum Council and the Council on Foreign Relations.

 

The Hill /  David L. Goldwyn / October 29

 

A 14-year-long oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico could become one of the worst in U.S. history

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Tampa Bay Times / Darryl Fears / October 22

 

NEW ORLEANS — An oil spill that has been quietly leaking millions of barrels into the Gulf of Mexico has gone unplugged for so long that it now verges on becoming one of the worst offshore disasters in U.S. history.

Between 300 and 700 barrels of oil per day have been spewing from a site 12 miles off the Louisiana coast since 2004, when an oil-production platform owned by Taylor Energy sank in a mudslide triggered by Hurricane Ivan. Many of the wells have not been capped, and federal officials estimate that the spill could continue through this century. With no fix in sight, the Taylor offshore spill is threatening to overtake BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster as the largest ever.

As oil continues to spoil the Gulf, the Trump administration is proposing the largest expansion of leases for the oil and gas industry, with the potential to open nearly the entire outer continental shelf to offshore drilling. That includes the Atlantic coast, where drilling hasn’t happened in more than a century and where hurricanes hit with double the regularity of the Gulf.

Expansion plans come despite fears that the offshore oil industry is poorly regulated and that the planet needs to decrease fossil fuels to combat climate change, as well as the knowledge that 14 years after Ivan took down Taylor’s platform, the broken wells are releasing so much oil that researchers needed respirators to study the damage.

“I don’t think people know that we have this ocean in the United States that’s filled with industry,” said Scott Eustis, an ecologist for the Gulf Restoration Network, as his six-seat plane circled the spill site on a flyover last summer. On the horizon, a forest of oil platforms rose up from the Gulf’s waters, and all that is left of the doomed Taylor platform are rainbow-colored oil slicks that are often visible for miles. He cannot imagine similar development in the Atlantic, where the majority of coastal state governors, lawmakers, attorneys general and residents have aligned against the administration’s proposal.

The Taylor Energy spill is largely unknown outside Louisiana because of the company’s effort to keep it secret in the hopes of protecting its reputation and proprietary information about its operations, according to a lawsuit that eventually forced the company to reveal its cleanup plan. The spill was hidden for six years before environmental watchdog groups stumbled on oil slicks while monitoring the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster a few miles north of the Taylor site in 2010.

The Interior Department is fighting an effort by Taylor Energy to walk away from the disaster. The company sued Interior in federal court, seeking the return of about $450 million left in a trust it established with the government to fund its work to recover part of the wreckage and locate wells buried under 100 feet of muck.

Taylor Energy declined to comment. The company has argued that there’s no evidence to prove any of the wells are leaking. Last month, the Justice Department submitted an independent analysis showing that the spill was much larger than the one-to-55 barrels per day that the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center (NRC) claimed, using data supplied by the oil company.

The author of the analysis, Oscar Garcia-Pineda, a geoscience consultant who specializes in remote sensing of oil spills, said there were several instances when the NRC reported low estimates on the same days he was finding heavy layers of oil in the field.

“There is abundant evidence that supports the fact that these reports from NRC are incorrect,” Garcia-Pineda wrote. Later he said: “My conclusion is that NRC reports are not reliable.”

In an era of climate change and warmer open waters, the storms are becoming more frequent and violent. Starting with Ivan in 2004, several hurricanes battered or destroyed more than 150 platforms in just four years.

On average, 330,000 gallons of crude are spilled each year in Louisiana from offshore platforms and onshore oil tanks, according to a state agency that monitors them.

The Gulf is one of the richest and most productive oil and gas regions in the world, expected to yield more than 600 million barrels this year alone, nearly 20 percent of the total U.S. oil production. Another 40 billion barrels rest underground, waiting to be recovered, government analysts say.

About 2,000 platforms stand in the waters off the Bayou State. Nearly 2,000 others are off the coasts of its neighbors, Texas and Mississippi. On top of that are nearly 50,000 miles of active and inactive pipelines carrying oil and minerals to the shore.

And the costs are high.

For every 1,000 wells in state and federal waters, there’s an average of 20 uncontrolled releases of oil – or blowouts – every year. A fire erupts offshore every three days, on average, and hundreds of workers are injured annually.

BP has paid or set aside $66 billion for fines, legal settlements and cleanup of the 168 million-gallon spill – a sum that the oil giant could, painfully, afford. But many companies with Gulf leases and drilling operations are small, financially at-risk and hard-pressed to pay for an accident approaching that scale.

One of them was Taylor Energy.

– – –

Taylor Energy was a giant in New Orleans.

Owned by Patrick Taylor, a magnate and philanthropist who launched an ambitious college scholarship program for low-income students, it was once the only individually owned company to explore for and produce oil in the Gulf of Mexico, according to his namesake foundation.

Taylor made what was arguably his most ambitious transaction in 1995, when he took over an oil-production platform once operated by BP. Standing in more than 450 feet of water, it was about 40 stories tall. Its legs were pile-driven into the muddy ocean floor and funnels were attached to 28 drilled oil wells.

At its peak, the oil company helped make Taylor and his wife, Phyllis, the richest couple in the Big Easy.

That investment was obliterated on Sept. 15, 2004, when Hurricane Ivan unleashed 145 mph winds and waves that topped 70 feet as it roared into the Gulf. Deep underwater, the Category 4 storm shook loose tons of mud and buckled the platform.

The avalanche sank the colossal structure and knocked it “170 meters down slope of its original location,” researcher Sarah Josephine Harrison wrote in a postmortem of the incident.

More than 620 barrels of crude oil stacked on its deck came tumbling down with it. The sleeves that conducted oil from its wells were mangled and ripped away. A mixture of steel and leaking oil was buried in 150 feet of mud.

Less than two months after the storm, Patrick F. Taylor died of a heart infection at 67, leaving a fortune for philanthropy and a massive cleanup bill.

Taylor Energy reported the spill to the Coast Guard, which monitored the site for more than half a decade without making the public fully aware of the mess it was seeing. Four years after the leak started, in July 2008, the Coast Guard informed the company that the spill had been deemed “a continuous, unsecured crude oil discharge” that posed “a significant threat to the environment,” according to a lawsuit between Taylor Energy and its insurer.

Taylor Energy made a deal with federal officials to establish a $666 million trust to stop the spill.

It would be a delicate, risky operation. Taylor and the contractors it hired were asked to somehow locate wells in a nearly impenetrable grave of mud and debris, then cap them. Failing that, it could create a device to contain the leak.

But they were forbidden from boring or drilling through the muck for fear that they would strike a pipe or well, risking the kind of catastrophe on the scale of the BP disaster a few miles south. That precaution slowed the pace of the salvage operation.

“We had no idea that any of that was going on,” said Marylee Orr, executive director of the Louisiana Environmental Action Network.

Taylor Energy spent a fortune to pluck the deck of the platform from the ocean and plug about a third of the wells. It built a kind of shield to keep the crude from rising.

But no matter what it did, the oil kept leaking.

– – –

In 2010, six years after the oil leak started, scientists studying the BP spill realized something was amiss with the oil slicks they were seeing.

“We were flying to monitor the BP disaster and we kept seeing these slicks, but they were nowhere near the BP spill,” said Cynthia Sarthou, executive director of the Gulf Restoration Network, which monitors the water from boats and planes.

Satellite images confirmed the oddity.

“It was there all the time, longer than the BP spill,” said John Amos, founder and president of Sky Truth, a nonprofit organization that tracks pollution.

Under the Oil Pollution Act, companies are obligated to report hazardous spills to the NRC, which maintains a database of chemical pollution.

No law compels the companies or the federal government to raise public awareness, but the Clean Water Act clearly calls for citizen involvement.

Environmentalists took Taylor Energy to court.

In their lawsuit, the conservationists called the agreement between Taylor Energy and the federal government a secret deal “that was inconsistent with national policy.”

That policy, they argued, was made clear in the Clean Water Act, which mandates “public participation in the . . . enforcement of any regulation.” Citizen participation, the act says, “shall be provided for, encouraged and assisted.”

Taylor Energy and the Coast Guard – which is part of a Unified Command of federal agencies that includes the Interior Department, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency – did not live up to the policy. In fact, the public wasn’t made aware of the spill even after a private firm tested fish in the area and submitted an assessment to Taylor Energy in 2009 that said “there is an acceptable risk to humans if fish from the . . . area are consumed.”

“Taylor has failed to provide the public with information regarding the pace and extent of the oil leaks and Taylor’s efforts to control the leaks,” the lawsuit said.

It would take another three years before the government revealed an even deeper truth. Taylor Energy had been playing down the severity of the spill. An Associated Press investigation in 2015 determined that it was about 20 times worse than the company had reported.

Taylor Energy had argued that the leak was two gallons per day; the Coast Guard finally said it was 84 gallons or more, and was almost certainly coming from any of 16 wells.

“There’s a fine for not reporting, but none for underreporting,” Amos said. “If it’s only three gallons a day, who cares, that’s a trivial problem.”

– – –

Nearly a decade after the oil platform went down, the government determined that the actual level of oil leaking into the Gulf was between one and 55 barrels per day. Now, the new estimate dwarfs that: up to 700 barrels per day. Each barrel contains 42 gallons.

Despite that finding, NOAA is still in the early stages of a resource assessment of marine life that could explain the impact of the Taylor Energy spill, and is more than three years behind a deadline to issue a biological determination of the BP spill’s impact on marine life.

In July, Earthjustice, a nonprofit legal organization that represents conservation groups, sued NOAA for failing to produce a timely study.

Like Eustis, Amos said Atlantic coast residents should be wary. But in that region, where beaches and tourism enrich nearly every state, distrust over offshore leasing and drilling is bipartisan.

Governors, state lawmakers and attorneys general lashed out at the administration’s proposal. New Jersey passed a law that forbids oil and infrastructure in state waters three miles from shore, crippling any effort to run pipelines from platforms to the shore. Other states passed similar laws.

In the Carolinas, where Hurricane Florence’s winds topped 150 mph and produced a monster 83-foot wave as it neared landfall, governors who represent both political parties implored Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke to rethink the plan.

Meanwhile, in the Gulf, Taylor Energy was down to a single employee – its president, William Pecue.

At a 2016 public forum in Baton Rouge, Pecue made the case for allowing the company to walk away from its obligation to clean up the mess. Taylor Energy had been sold to a joint venture of South Korean companies in 2008, the same year it started the $666 million trust. A third of the money had been spent on cleanup, and only a third of the leaking wells had been fixed. But Pecue wanted to recover $450 million, arguing the spill could not be contained.

“I can affirmatively say that we do believe this was an act of God under the legal definition,” Pecue said. In other words, Taylor Energy had no control over the hurricane.

But Ivan was no freak storm.

It was one of more than 600 that have been tracked in the Gulf since records were kept in the mid-1800s, according to NOAA.

Fourteen years after the Taylor spill, and 10 years after the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the federal government still doesn’t know the spills’ full impact on marine life. And there is no economic analysis showing the value of the oil flowing into the sea and potential royalties lost to taxpayers. Activists also want an analysis to determine if oil is ruining marshland and making its way to beaches.

“Even though oil did not reach a lot of these beaches [during the BP spill], the fact that the public heard about it, it killed the beach economy for quite some time,” Sarthou said. “You don’t want to go to a beach with tar balls or oil washing up.”

At the time, Sarthou was unaware that Garcia-Pineda was conducting a study in the Gulf that would show the spill was far worse than imagined – up to 10 times worse than what the federal government was reporting.

As the saga in the Gulf plays out, wary officials on the Atlantic coast are anxiously watching President Donald Trump’s proposal to offer federal offshore leases.

It would take at least a decade for Atlantic drilling to start. The industry would first want to conduct seismic testing to determine the amount of oil and gas in the ground. Depending on the results, companies would bid for the leases. Interior has yet to approve seismic testing, which some studies say harms marine life, including large mammals such as dolphins and whales.

Oil and gas representatives say energy development off that coast could provide South Carolina with $2.7 billion in annual economic growth, 35,000 jobs and potentially lower heating costs for residents struggling to pay their bills.

During a federal informational hearing in South Carolina to explain the Trump administration’s plan in February, Mark Harmon, the director of a state unit of the American Petroleum Institute, stressed that point. “Ultimately, it means the potential for jobs and reinvestment in the community,” he said.

Once the oil industry gains a foothold in a region, it’s game over, said Chris Eaton, an Earthjustice attorney.

“A major part of the economy starts to change” as jobs with pay approaching $100,000 transform a tourism market to oil. “If it gets going, that train isn’t going to stop,” he said. “Let’s talk about what’s happening in the Gulf before we move into the Atlantic.”

 

Tampa Bay Times / Darryl Fears / October 22

 

Línea Base Ambiental: Retos y Oportunidades para el Sector Hidrocarburos 

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Los estudios de Línea Base Ambiental (LBA) son estudios de tipo técnico especializados que son requeridos por la Agencia de Seguridad, Energía y Ambiente(ASEA) de la Secretaria de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT) a los regulados del Sector Hidrocarburos para: determinar las condiciones ambientales en las que se encuentran los componentes ambientales de las áreas contractuales, así como la identificación y registro de daños preexistentes y daños ambientales.

La LBA es también un insumo importante para la elaboración de las Manifestaciones de Impacto Ambiental, a efecto de cumplir con lo dispuesto en el contrato celebrado entre la Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos (CNH) y los Regulados. Los objetivos principales para la realización de los estudios de LBA son:

  • Identificar y describir la infraestructura existente en el área contractual y su estado actual físico y operacional para identificar y evaluar los daños ambientales que hayan sido generados por esta, para el deslinde de responsabilidades.
  • Identificar y evaluar las condiciones ambientales en que se encuentran los ecosistemas y recursos naturales, existentes en el área contractual y zona de influencia, previo a la ejecución de las actividades del contrato.
  • Evaluar los daños y pasivos ambientales ocasionados por las actividades humanas o procesos naturales en la zona contractual y de influencia a efecto de deslindarse de las responsabilidades

En el artículo 27, párrafo séptimo de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, se establece que las actividades de exploración y extracción del petróleo y demás hidrocarburos se realizarán mediante asignaciones a empresas productivas del Estado o a través de contratos con éstas o con particulares, por lo que la presentación de la LBA ante la ASEA se traduce en una obligación para estas entidades.

Para orientar la elaboración de los estudios de LBA la autoridad a puesto a disposición de los regulados dos guias: a) “Guía para la elaboración y presentación de la Línea Base Ambiental previo al inicio de las actividades de Exploración y Extracción de Hidrocarburos en Áreas Terrestres” y b) la “Guía para la elaboración y presentación de la línea base ambiental previo al inicio de las actividades marinas de exploración y extracción de hidrocarburos en aguas someras”.

Es sumamente importante para los regulados que pretenden el aprovechamiento de zonas contractuales, el identificar, evaluar y detallar de manera precisa los daños ambientales preexistentes a través de los estudios de LBA, ya que solo podrán eximir su responsabilidad ambiental respecto a dichos daños, siempre y cuando hayan sido registrados y manifestados en dichos estudios.

Considernado la relevancia que tienen los estudios de LBA para los regulados, en cuanto al deslinde de los pasivos ambientales y sociales preexistentes de las áreas contractuales, es fundamental que dimensionen la necesidad de que la elaboración de la LBA debe ser realizada por empresas o plataformas técnico-científicas de especialistas calificados y con capacidad demostrada para la realización de este tipo de estudios. El deslindarse de dichos pasivos a través de buenos estudios de LBA y no asumir ningun riesgo financiero, social, legal y ambiental, es uno se los mejores seguros para sostener la viabilidad de sus inversiones y no comprometer su reputación como empresa y regulado ante la eventualidad de que se generen contingencias ambientales.

Un buen estudio de LBA debe sustentar además, las bases para el diseño e implementación de los Sistemas de Manejo y Gestión Ambiental y Social (SMGAS) para la prevención, manejo, mitigación y monitoreo de impactos ambientales y sociales durante las fases de preparación, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de los proyectos o de las áreas contractuales que deberán ser establecidos en las manifestaciones de impacto ambiental, estudios del cambio de uso del suelo de terrenos forestales, evaluaciones de impacto social y estudios de riesgo ambiental que correspondan. El proceso de elaboración y evaluación de los estudios de LBA se presenta en la siguiente figura:

 

 

Con más de 20 años de experiencia, cobertura internacional y fuerte compromiso con la sustentabilidad, la innovación y la calidad de nuestros servicios en el sector hidrocarburos, energía, turismo, desarrollo urbano,  infraestructura, medio ambiente y minería; GPPA y nuestros socios estratégicos NRGI Brokers y Rodríguez Dávalos Abogados, asi como especialistas de diferentes institutos y centros de investigación, hemos conformado una plataforma técnico-cientifica de expertos nacionales e internacionales con la mayor capacidad en el país para ofrecer soluciones integrales y con valor agregado a los regulados del sector hidrocarburos, para resolver sus necesidades en materia de planeación, manejo, gestión ambiental y legal, desarrollo sostenible, fianzas y seguros de responsabilidad ambiental,  incluyendo la elaboración de estudios de LBA, Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, Evaluación de Impacto Social, entre otros productos y servicios.

 

Para mayor información y cualquier duda o necesidad derivada de la información presentada en el presente boletín, estamos a su disposición a través de:

Consultores en Gestión Política y Planificación Ambiental, S.C.

David Zárate Lomelí

Director General

Teléfono: (998) 6 88 08 75

E-mail: dzarate@gppa.com.mx

www.gppa.com.mx

The regime of strict liability in the activities of Exploration and Extraction of hydrocarbons

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The General Administrative Provisions that establish the Guidelines on Industrial and Operational Safety and Environmental Protection to carry out the activities of Surface Recognition and Exploration, Exploration and Extraction of Hydrocarbons (DACG/E&E), were published in the Official Gazette of the Federation, issued by the National Agency for Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection of the Hydrocarbons Sector (ASEA), established  that those who carry out works or activities for the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons are subject to a regime of strict liability, that is, they operate under the assumption that they are creating a risk to people and the environment and, therefore, in case of causing damage they must carry out its repair, without this being conditioned to prove their fault.

 

Derived from the above, ASEA imposes on operators the obligation to perform all actions necessary to prevent environmental damage arising from the risks created, for which they must contain, characterize and remedy them with opportunity under their own processes and according to the applicable legislation and regulations.

 

In this sense, the “DACG/E&E” establish that Exploration and Extraction activities must be carried out under certain principles, such as:

 

  1. Minimize the risks at a level that is as low as reasonably possible, that is, up to a level where it is demonstrated that the cost of continuing to reduce that risk is greater compared to the economic benefit that would be obtained. This allows a reasonable balance between economic activity and the protection of third parties and the environment.
  2. Regularly review the risk reduction measures in order to update them based on the technological development and specialized knowledge.

 

  1. Implement emergency measures and foster a culture of the protection of people, the environment and facilities.

 

The aforementioned principles are aimed at preventing the accidents from happening, so they must be complemented with measures that have as their object the repair and / or compensation of the damages caused by the an accident.

 

One of the most effective measures to achieve this is to have financial instruments that allow for the consequences of the materialization of risks, such as an insurance.

At NRGI Broker we are experts in insurance for the Exploration and Extraction of Hydrocarbons. Come to us.

 

The strategic value of the pipelines

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The Five-Year Expansion Plan of the National Integrated Natural Gas Transportation and Storage System 2015-2019 contemplates the construction of more than 5,000 km of natural gas pipelines, with an estimated investment of close to 10,000 million dollars. For its elaboration, the National Infrastructure Program 2014-2018 was taken as a basis, in which the gas pipeline construction projects are planned, with an approach that seeks to guide the integral functionality of the new infrastructure of the country.

On the other hand, the main objective of the Quinquennial Plan is to bring natural gas, considered the most efficient fuel and of intensive use, to different areas of the country, among which are Hidalgo, Puebla, Veracruz, Aguascalientes, Durango, Michoacán, Guerrero, San Luis Potosi, Chihuahua, Sonora, Oaxaca, Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, especially in industrial areas and those where up to now this hydrocarbon has not been accessed.

The foregoing is in line with one of the objectives of the Energy Reform, consisting of the safe, reliable and competitive supply of natural gas.

These new gas pipelines will be added to the more than 10,000 km already existing, and will increase the capacity of transportation of natural gas by 50%.

It is worth mentioning that the expansion of the gas pipeline network can bring with it a greater possibility of accidents, considering that the pipelines are one of the means of transport that present a greater frequency and severity of accidents, due to the fact that they are exposed to various hazards as: explosion, fire, natural phenomena and ill-intentioned acts.

Therefore, it is very important that during the construction and operation of the pipelines, the insurance coverage is adequate for the complexity of this means of transport, for which it must be taken into account that the damages may affect the infrastructure, people, their assets and the environment.

In NRGI Broker we are experts in designing comprehensive insurance schemes for the Hydrocarbons Sector, come to us.

 

Is Mexico Set To Boost Oil Output?

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Oil Price / By The Dialogue / August 16

 

On July 27, Mexican president-elect Andrés Manuel López Obrador said his government will earmark more than $9 billion for state-run energy companies next year and start working on a new oil refinery in southern Mexico. The moves seek to reduce reliance on fuel imports from the United States while boosting the country’s oil production, which has significantly fallen off in recent years. López Obrador did not say how he would fund his proposals, an omission that worries analysts concerned about Pemex’s already heavy debt burden. He also announced Octavio Romero Oropeza as the incoming head of Pemex. Will the promised investment help accelerate Pemex’s oil and gas production? What else is needed to boost output? How well prepared is Romero Oropeza to lead Pemex, and what should his priorities be? Four Mexican energy experts weighed in with their opinions on these developments.

George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence in Houston: The 116-page energy sector document that the Morena transition team issued on July 10 sports both good and bad ideas. First, among the good ideas, is advocating independent unions in the oil sector (the first time since 1935 that a political party has done this). Second is suspending until further review the so-called farm-outs of Pemex—the idea that civil servants (Pemex employees) and market-disciplined managers of oil companies can have a joint venture based on sharing risk and reward only makes sense on paper. Third is promoting the concept of intelligent cities, including low energy consumption, renewable energy and intelligent grids. A fourth good idea is expanding the grid of natural gas pipelines and the use of renewable energy sources and cogeneration. Among the bad ideas: first is reactivating the refinery project in Tula and analyzing the construction of another refinery in the Gulf of Mexico. Pemex refinery upgrades have gone badly for the past 20 years, notably in Cadereyta, Villahermosa and Tula. A new refinery could take three years just for design and another three for contracting and financing. López Obrador would likely leave office before the first shovelful of earth was turned for the new refinery. Second is the upgrade of the role of Pemex in the energy space. The Morena team proposes to eliminate the so-called ‘asymmetrical regulations’ that restrict Pemex to compete effectively—to aspire to ‘make Pemex great again’ as a state agency is to ignore global success stories of state oil companies with mixed-equity structures, market financing and professional management. Finally, a third bad idea is to overstate (and obfuscate) the potential for change via public policy: there is nothing that is actionable in statements such as ‘the necessary investments in Pemex should be made,’ or ‘efforts to increase exploration and production of natural gas should be made to favor the petrochemical industry,’ or ‘deepen and coordinate all efforts to eliminate the black market in petroleum products.’ Notably, one word that does not appear in the text is ‘corruption,’ an unexpected omission by a candidate that vowed to end corruption by example. Finally, former Pemex director general Adrián Lajous recently calculated the average tenure of a director general as two years and four months. Pemex, legally configured as an agency of the federal government, always has a dozen cooks in its kitchen of corporate governance. If a director general had the authority to order early retirement for 35,000 Pemex unionized workers, there would be opportunities for leadership.

David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City: In a previous comment for the Energy Advisor on June 15, I mentioned that President-elect López Obrador’s energy team has excellent, progressive plans in renewable energy. Sadly, the same does not apply to conventional energy. The naming of Octavio Romero and Manuel Bartlett to head state-run Pemex and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) has been severely criticized because of their hardline political, ideological, non-technical, non-business nature. They may be okay for rooting out corruption, but they add to fears that recent energy reforms may be rolled back, even if they and López Obrador himself deny legal amendments will be made. Congress will ultimately decide on this, and the outlook there is bad. Reforms can be reversed in practice, anyway, just through day-to-day opposition. López Obrador says he will push oil output up sharply to 2.5 million barrels per day, but reserves and reservoirs are largely depleted, there are no new discoveries, and there is not enough money for a vast exploration effort. Foreign operators will need several years to develop their projects. His best bet for ramping up output quickly would be fracking, but he promises to prohibit that, thinking that environmental risks will be greater than the benefits. His refining plans are unrealistic, too. López Obrador´s native Tabasco State offers the wrong site and the wrong logistics for a large-scale refinery to be built in just three years. Such a project normally requires two years to study, plan and tender, then another five or six years to build. Even then, it can hardly be profitable if Mexico produces and processes only very heavy crude. Intentions to rescue Pemex and reduce reliance on energy imports are good, but the prospects are not.

 

Oil Price / By The Dialogue / August 16

 

Seguros para las actividades de transporte, almacenamiento, distribución y expendio de hidrocarburos y petrolíferos; compresión, descompresión, licuefacción y regasificación de gas natural  

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Las empresas que realicen actividades de Transporte, Almacenamiento, Distribución y Expendio de Hidrocarburos y Petrolíferos, así como Compresión, Descompresión, Licuefacción y Regasificación de Gas Natural deben contar con seguros, de acuerdo a las Disposiciones Administrativas de Carácter General en materia de Seguros para dichas actividades, publicadas en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el 23 de julio de 2018 (DAGCS-TADE).

Con ello, la Agencia de Seguridad Industrial y Protección del Medio Ambiente del Sector Hidrocarburos (ASEA) cumple con la atribución que le fue otorgada en el artículo 6, fracción I, inciso c), de su Ley, en donde se establece “el requerimiento de garantías o cualquier otro instrumento financiero para que los Regulados cuenten con coberturas financieras contingentes frente a los daños o perjuicios que pudieran generar” en toda la cadena de valor de los hidrocarburos.

Requerir garantías financieras obedece al hecho de que el sector de los hidrocarburos es particularmente susceptible a experimentar accidentes, ya que el petróleo y el gas natural son considerados sustancias peligrosas, por su potencial para generar incendios, explosiones o contaminación por derrames.

Si bien es cierto que las empresas son cada vez más conscientes de la importancia de implementar programas de administración de riesgos, que les permitan identificar, analizar, controlar, transferir y monitorear los riesgos a los que están expuestas, hay eventos difíciles de predecir o que no pueden ser controlados, como son los desastres naturales o la negligencia y/o impericia de empleados o de terceros.

Es precisamente para esos riesgos que superan las medidas preventivas que el seguro se vuelve el instrumento financiero por excelencia para evitar pérdidas mayores que aquellas derivadas del siniestro, como pueden ser: afectación patrimonial; incumplimiento ante clientes y proveedores; paralización de las actividades y la quiebra.

Actualmente los seguros son reconocidos como una de las mejores prácticas internacionales en materia de seguridad industrial y protección ambiental en el sector hidrocarburos, para reparar los daños y absorber las pérdidas económicas que se puedan derivar de un siniestro.

La publicación de la regulación en materia de seguros de responsabilidad civil y responsabilidad ambiental para las actividades de Transporte, Almacenamiento, Distribución y Expendio de hidrocarburos y petrolíferos, así como Compresión, Descompresión, Licuefacción y Regasificación de Gas Natural establece montos mínimos de seguros para ciertas actividades como el transporte por auto-tanque, buque-tanque y carro-tanque. Para otras actividades cuyas características hacen difícil establecer un estándar, se solicita elaborar un estudio de pérdida máxima probable para determinar la suma asegurada.

Los seguros deberán registrarse ante la ASEA como requisito previo para obtener el permiso correspondiente de la Comisión Reguladora de Energía (CRE).

En NRGI Broker somos expertos en administración de riesgos y seguros y fuimos el consultor de la ASEA para la regulación en materia de seguros de responsabilidad civil y responsabilidad ambiental para Transporte, Almacenamiento, Distribución y Expendio de hidrocarburos y petrolíferos; Compresión, Descompresión, Licuefacción y Regasificación de Gas Natural, por lo que somos la mejor opción para asesorarte.

Acércate a nosotros, con gusto te atenderemos.

[1] Conocido como PML (Probable Maximum Loss), por sus siglas en inglés.

 

La administración de riesgos en el sector hidrocarburos: Almacenamiento y Transporte por ductos

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Las terminales de almacenamiento y los ductos son la infraestructura estratégica para lograr el avance y consolidación de la Reforma Energética.

Se trata, por tanto, de un área de oportunidad que seguirá generando nuevas inversiones, pero que a su vez incrementará los desafíos para los inversionistas, así como a las autoridades, principalmente en lo relativo a:

1) Asegurar el suministro energético.

2) Incrementar la competitividad mediante enfoques de menor costo.

3) Proteger a las personas,  las instalaciones y el cuidado del medio ambiente.

Todo ello nos lleva a ser conscientes que en la medida que se incrementen las actividades de toda la cadena de valor de los hidrocarburos, también podemos vernos expuestos a mayores riesgos.

De ahí la importancia  que tiene que las empresas adopten el enfoque de la administración de riesgos en el desarrollo de sus proyectos, para evitar que se produzcan eventos súbitos e indeseados que puedan provocar daños y perjuicios a terceros en sus instalaciones, activos o al bien que nos pertenece a todos, me refiero al medio ambiente y en caso de que suceda el incidente o accidente, los responsables cuenten con las garantías financieras que les permitan tener los recursos necesarios para asumir las responsabilidades y reparar los daños, ese respaldo es posible a través de un  programa de seguros.

Todos estamos expuestos a sufrir un accidente, los riesgos son latentes en todas las actividades de la vida y especialmente en una industria calificada de alto riesgo, como es la de los hidrocarburos.

La diferencia está en la forma en que nos relacionamos con ellos. Si bien, las medidas de prevención y la utilización de los estándares y mejores prácticas internacionales de seguridad industrial y protección del medio ambiente pueden disminuir la frecuencia, son muchos los factores que inciden para que se presente un siniestro y algunos de ellos no se pueden prever, como es el caso de un desastre natural como son los huracanes o terremotos solo por citar algunos.

Con el adecuado programa integral de seguros, las empresas que realizan actividades con hidrocarburos y petrolíferos pueden contar con diversos beneficios:

  • Cumplen con sus responsabilidades legales en caso de causar daños o perjuicios a terceros que muchas veces llegan a ser mayores que el daño directo a los equipos o instalaciones.
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    Disponen del respaldo económico que les da la solvencia de las instituciones de seguros, por los riesgos a los que está expuesta la organización o actividad que llevan a cabo, porque los seguros cubren la mayor parte de riesgos del sector hidrocarburos desde la etapa de la exploración, la extracción, la construcción y hasta la operación de las terminales de almacenamiento y los ductos.
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  • Protegen el patrimonio del asegurado, ya que en caso de un siniestro, la aseguradora no solo responderá por los daños ocasionados, sino que hace posible que las empresas puedan volver a trabajar sin sufrir un quebranto.
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  • Los seguros no inmovilizan capital, pues basta con el pago de la prima para obtener certeza de su vigencia y sus beneficios.
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En síntesis los seguros son un aliado estratégico para la operación exitosa de su negocio, que en el mundo entero han probado su eficacia.


En NRGI Broker, somos expertos en seguros. Acércate a nosotros, con gusto te atenderemos.


 




El descontrol de pozos ¿un riesgo catastrófico?
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Un descontrol de pozo ocurre cuando la presión de la formación[1] es mayor a la presión del fluido de control, lo que provoca un reventón o blow out, que no puede manejarse a voluntad.


El descontrol de un pozo es el evento más indeseado en materia de actividades petroleras, por las consecuencias catastróficas que se pueden desencadenar, tales como pérdida de vidas humanas, pérdida del pozo y del equipo de perforación, así como daños al medio ambiente.


El caso de mayores proporciones que se ha vivido recientemente en el mundo fue el Deepwater Horizon, en Estados Unidos. El 20 de abril de 2010, la empresa británica British Petroleum (BP) se encontraba realizando operaciones de exploración de aguas profundas en el pozo Macondo, ubicado a 75 kilómetros de la costa de Luisiana, cuando un escape de gas provocó una explosión de la plataforma semi-sumergible Deepwater Horizon con un incendio que duró 36 horas. Millones de barriles de petróleo fueron derramados, en una superficie de entre 86,500 y 180,000 kilómetros cuadrados; fallecieron 11 personas y otras más resultaron heridas.


Este siniestro es considerado uno de los peores en la industria del petróleo, no sólo por los daños directos provocados, sino también por los perjuicios resultantes, tales como la afectación a las actividades pesquera y turística.


En México no existen cifras oficiales acerca de qué tan frecuentemente se descontrola un pozo, pero el peor caso conocido hasta ahora fue el del Ixtoc I. El 3 de junio de 1979, mientras se llevaban a cabo los trabajos de perforación del pozo Ixtoc I de Petróleos Mexicanos, se produjo el descontrol del pozo, lo que ocasionó un incendio de gran magnitud y el derrame de más de 3 millones de barriles de crudo. El evento provocó que el petróleo llegara hasta las costas de Campeche, Tabasco, Veracruz y Tamaulipas e incluso a algunas zonas de Texas, por las que Estados Unidos solicitó compensación.


Para evitar un acontecimiento de este tipo que sin duda puede llegar a ser catastrófico, las empresas petroleras implementan diversas medidas de seguridad industrial y seguridad operativa, mediante la aplicación de sistemas adecuados de fluidos de perforación, equipos de medición y control de parámetros, y personal debidamente capacitado; no obstante la posibilidad de se origine el descontrol de un pozo es un riesgo latente.


De ahí la importancia de que las empresas petroleras cuenten con un programa integral de seguros, que les permita afrontar las consecuencias de un siniestro, sin poner en riesgo la rentabilidad de la compañía.


En NRGI Broker, somos expertos en programas integrales de seguros para empresas petroleras. Acércate a nosotros, con gusto te atenderemos.


[1] Por formación se entiende la estructura rocosa en la que se encuentra el hidrocarburo.




Prestige 2002 ¿Acaso podía ser peor?
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Después de 13 años de que ocurriera el desastre del buque petrolero Exxon Valdez, que tras una colisión derramó más 41 millones de litros de crudo al mar (40,000 toneladas), la historia se repitió aunque con consecuencias quizá aún peores, cuando el buque petrolero Prestige, con bandera de Bahamas, vertió 63,000 toneladas de fuel oil (un combustible pesado) a 250 km de la costa Da Morte.


El 13 de noviembre de 2002, el petrolero monocasco[1] Prestige lanzó una alerta debido a una ruptura en su estructura a través de la cual, se estima, salían diariamente 125 toneladas del combustible[2]; la respuesta a la emergencia no fue la adecuada y las órdenes para mantenerlo a salvo fueron contradictorias (en un inicio le dieron la orden de navegar hacia el norte -mar adentro- y posteriormente fue remolcado hacia el sur), lo que provocó que seis días después el buque se partiera a la mitad derramando su contenido sobre el mar.


Salvamento Marítimo pudo rescatar a la tripulación, sin embargo, los daños ambientales fueron muy graves, debido a la cantidad de hidrocarburo derramado, que se extendió por kilómetros y llegó a lugares donde las labores de limpieza fueron imposibles por la naturaleza del terreno (acantilados y fondo marino). Durante los primeros nueve meses posteriores al desastre, se recogieron más de 23.000 aves llenas de petróleo (17.000 de ellas muertas)[3].


En el ámbito económico, la mayor afectación fue en el sector pesquero que se vio obligado a paralizar sus actividades; las Cámaras de Comercio en España cifraron las pérdidas en 1.400 millones de euros, mientras que un informe pericial de la Fiscalía cuantificó en 3,862.42 millones de euros el impacto ambiental y económico en el Estado español[4].


A través de los lamentables casos de los siniestros de Exxon Valdez, 1989 y Prestige, 2002, podemos estar seguros de dos factores fundamentales: 1) La contaminación con hidrocarburos y/o petrolíferos tiene efectos muy graves en el medio ambiente y sus daños llegan a ser irreparables; 2) No contar con un adecuado programa de administración de riesgos que permita saber a todos los involucrados qué hacer en caso de que se materialice un riesgo puede ser la diferencia respecto al saldo final de daños y, por supuesto, en el desembolso económico.


En NRGI Broker, somos expertos en seguros de responsabilidad ambiental y además contamos con un equipo de expertos en administración de riesgos. Acércate a nosotros, con gusto te atenderemos.




[1] Si bien la obligación de que los buque -tanques deben ser construidos con doble casco fue establecida en 1990 en el Convenio Internacional para prevenir la Contaminación por los Buques, aquellos construidos con anterioridad todavía pudieron navegar con un solo casco hasta el término de su vida útil, como fue el caso del Prestige, construido en 1976.


[2] http://www.abc.es/local-galicia/20131113/abci-mayor-catastrofe-ecologica-prestige-201311131211.html


[3] http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/1617114/0/claves/desastre/prestige/


[4] Ibídem.