Unfinished business: Putting the final touches on the USMCA

The Hill /  David L. Goldwyn / October 29

 

The proposed US Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA) makes important, but incomplete, progress in securing an integrated North American energy market.

In terms of progress, the agreement preserves zero tariffs for trade in oil, gas and petroleum products across North America. It effectively locks in Mexico’s historic energy reforms by ensuring that Mexico cannot reinstate restrictions on US investment in the oil and gas sector. A “ratchet” clause ensures that if Mexico decides to further liberalize the sector, then that higher floor becomes the new USMCA commitment.

While Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms are weaker, they remain in force for certain “covered sectors,” including oil and gas investments in Mexico and power generation and pipeline investments where the investor has a contract with the government.

These are all positive steps for North American energy security. Mexico and Canada provide the United States with the heavy grades of oil not produced domestically, helping US refineries produce gasoline at the lowest possible cost. Thanks to this relationship,  the United States is an efficient net exporter of petroleum products.

However, while this progress is laudable, it remains incomplete.

In the rush to conclude the agreement, effective protection for power generation investments like new wind and solar plants, refining and natural gas infrastructure, and power transmission lines were left out, perhaps inadvertently. Contracts for these investments are with state owned enterprises (SOEs) like Mexico’s CFE and PEMEX, which do not now fall within the definition of “federal government” because they are not disposing of assets but signing a contract for service. These essential investments, in the gas and refined product infrastructure which carry US products to and through Mexico, transmission lines which carry US electricity south, and investments in power generation are not permitted to bring ISDS claims to enforce their rights.

This is an oversight, and a protection these investments should enjoy. Rather, the proposed agreement creates an uneven playing field as investors who do have a contract with the Federal government, say for exploration, are entitled to bring an ISDS claim for any of their businesses, while those who do not have such contract do not. The problem can be easily fixed by expanding the definition of federal government to include these wholly owned SOEs.

These (for now) unprotected investments are critical to North American energy security. They secure US exports of electricity and natural gas and assure the continued reliability of the North American electricity system. They are the lifelines which carry US exports to Mexico – currently our number one customer for natural gas and petroleum products.

Protecting investments in Mexico’s electricity sector improves US national security by supporting Mexico’s prosperity through a more resilient power system.

Finally, if US power sector investments in Mexico are not protected and thus potentially hindered or lost, China is certain to fill the gap.

Chinese investment in all forms of power generation, transmission, and distribution is rapidly accelerating throughout Latin America. According to a recent Atlantic Council report, cumulative flows of Chinese foreign direct investment in Latin America have reached $110 billion, with $25 billion in oil and gas investment, and $13 billion in electricity, utilities and alternative energy. China’s State Grid has invested $7 billion in Brazil, through a combination of greenfield investments and acquisitions.

If the Mexican government is willing to offer these investments protections (and they are), and create a level playing field for American companies investing in our closest neighbor, the US should not object.

Fortunately, there is still time to correct the definition of eligible claimants as both sides ready the agreement for ratification.  With these modest steps, the United States, Mexico and Canada can improve the resilience of North America’s energy system, and the US can simultaneously advance its economic and national security interests.

David L. Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy and serves as chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center Energy Advisory Group. He served as the U.S. State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs from 2009 to 2011; he previously served as assistant secretary of energy for international affairs and as national security deputy to U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson. He is a member of the U.S. National Petroleum Council and the Council on Foreign Relations.

 

The Hill /  David L. Goldwyn / October 29

 

A 14-year-long oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico could become one of the worst in U.S. history

Tampa Bay Times / Darryl Fears / October 22

 

NEW ORLEANS — An oil spill that has been quietly leaking millions of barrels into the Gulf of Mexico has gone unplugged for so long that it now verges on becoming one of the worst offshore disasters in U.S. history.

Between 300 and 700 barrels of oil per day have been spewing from a site 12 miles off the Louisiana coast since 2004, when an oil-production platform owned by Taylor Energy sank in a mudslide triggered by Hurricane Ivan. Many of the wells have not been capped, and federal officials estimate that the spill could continue through this century. With no fix in sight, the Taylor offshore spill is threatening to overtake BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster as the largest ever.

As oil continues to spoil the Gulf, the Trump administration is proposing the largest expansion of leases for the oil and gas industry, with the potential to open nearly the entire outer continental shelf to offshore drilling. That includes the Atlantic coast, where drilling hasn’t happened in more than a century and where hurricanes hit with double the regularity of the Gulf.

Expansion plans come despite fears that the offshore oil industry is poorly regulated and that the planet needs to decrease fossil fuels to combat climate change, as well as the knowledge that 14 years after Ivan took down Taylor’s platform, the broken wells are releasing so much oil that researchers needed respirators to study the damage.

“I don’t think people know that we have this ocean in the United States that’s filled with industry,” said Scott Eustis, an ecologist for the Gulf Restoration Network, as his six-seat plane circled the spill site on a flyover last summer. On the horizon, a forest of oil platforms rose up from the Gulf’s waters, and all that is left of the doomed Taylor platform are rainbow-colored oil slicks that are often visible for miles. He cannot imagine similar development in the Atlantic, where the majority of coastal state governors, lawmakers, attorneys general and residents have aligned against the administration’s proposal.

The Taylor Energy spill is largely unknown outside Louisiana because of the company’s effort to keep it secret in the hopes of protecting its reputation and proprietary information about its operations, according to a lawsuit that eventually forced the company to reveal its cleanup plan. The spill was hidden for six years before environmental watchdog groups stumbled on oil slicks while monitoring the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster a few miles north of the Taylor site in 2010.

The Interior Department is fighting an effort by Taylor Energy to walk away from the disaster. The company sued Interior in federal court, seeking the return of about $450 million left in a trust it established with the government to fund its work to recover part of the wreckage and locate wells buried under 100 feet of muck.

Taylor Energy declined to comment. The company has argued that there’s no evidence to prove any of the wells are leaking. Last month, the Justice Department submitted an independent analysis showing that the spill was much larger than the one-to-55 barrels per day that the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center (NRC) claimed, using data supplied by the oil company.

The author of the analysis, Oscar Garcia-Pineda, a geoscience consultant who specializes in remote sensing of oil spills, said there were several instances when the NRC reported low estimates on the same days he was finding heavy layers of oil in the field.

“There is abundant evidence that supports the fact that these reports from NRC are incorrect,” Garcia-Pineda wrote. Later he said: “My conclusion is that NRC reports are not reliable.”

In an era of climate change and warmer open waters, the storms are becoming more frequent and violent. Starting with Ivan in 2004, several hurricanes battered or destroyed more than 150 platforms in just four years.

On average, 330,000 gallons of crude are spilled each year in Louisiana from offshore platforms and onshore oil tanks, according to a state agency that monitors them.

The Gulf is one of the richest and most productive oil and gas regions in the world, expected to yield more than 600 million barrels this year alone, nearly 20 percent of the total U.S. oil production. Another 40 billion barrels rest underground, waiting to be recovered, government analysts say.

About 2,000 platforms stand in the waters off the Bayou State. Nearly 2,000 others are off the coasts of its neighbors, Texas and Mississippi. On top of that are nearly 50,000 miles of active and inactive pipelines carrying oil and minerals to the shore.

And the costs are high.

For every 1,000 wells in state and federal waters, there’s an average of 20 uncontrolled releases of oil – or blowouts – every year. A fire erupts offshore every three days, on average, and hundreds of workers are injured annually.

BP has paid or set aside $66 billion for fines, legal settlements and cleanup of the 168 million-gallon spill – a sum that the oil giant could, painfully, afford. But many companies with Gulf leases and drilling operations are small, financially at-risk and hard-pressed to pay for an accident approaching that scale.

One of them was Taylor Energy.

– – –

Taylor Energy was a giant in New Orleans.

Owned by Patrick Taylor, a magnate and philanthropist who launched an ambitious college scholarship program for low-income students, it was once the only individually owned company to explore for and produce oil in the Gulf of Mexico, according to his namesake foundation.

Taylor made what was arguably his most ambitious transaction in 1995, when he took over an oil-production platform once operated by BP. Standing in more than 450 feet of water, it was about 40 stories tall. Its legs were pile-driven into the muddy ocean floor and funnels were attached to 28 drilled oil wells.

At its peak, the oil company helped make Taylor and his wife, Phyllis, the richest couple in the Big Easy.

That investment was obliterated on Sept. 15, 2004, when Hurricane Ivan unleashed 145 mph winds and waves that topped 70 feet as it roared into the Gulf. Deep underwater, the Category 4 storm shook loose tons of mud and buckled the platform.

The avalanche sank the colossal structure and knocked it “170 meters down slope of its original location,” researcher Sarah Josephine Harrison wrote in a postmortem of the incident.

More than 620 barrels of crude oil stacked on its deck came tumbling down with it. The sleeves that conducted oil from its wells were mangled and ripped away. A mixture of steel and leaking oil was buried in 150 feet of mud.

Less than two months after the storm, Patrick F. Taylor died of a heart infection at 67, leaving a fortune for philanthropy and a massive cleanup bill.

Taylor Energy reported the spill to the Coast Guard, which monitored the site for more than half a decade without making the public fully aware of the mess it was seeing. Four years after the leak started, in July 2008, the Coast Guard informed the company that the spill had been deemed “a continuous, unsecured crude oil discharge” that posed “a significant threat to the environment,” according to a lawsuit between Taylor Energy and its insurer.

Taylor Energy made a deal with federal officials to establish a $666 million trust to stop the spill.

It would be a delicate, risky operation. Taylor and the contractors it hired were asked to somehow locate wells in a nearly impenetrable grave of mud and debris, then cap them. Failing that, it could create a device to contain the leak.

But they were forbidden from boring or drilling through the muck for fear that they would strike a pipe or well, risking the kind of catastrophe on the scale of the BP disaster a few miles south. That precaution slowed the pace of the salvage operation.

“We had no idea that any of that was going on,” said Marylee Orr, executive director of the Louisiana Environmental Action Network.

Taylor Energy spent a fortune to pluck the deck of the platform from the ocean and plug about a third of the wells. It built a kind of shield to keep the crude from rising.

But no matter what it did, the oil kept leaking.

– – –

In 2010, six years after the oil leak started, scientists studying the BP spill realized something was amiss with the oil slicks they were seeing.

“We were flying to monitor the BP disaster and we kept seeing these slicks, but they were nowhere near the BP spill,” said Cynthia Sarthou, executive director of the Gulf Restoration Network, which monitors the water from boats and planes.

Satellite images confirmed the oddity.

“It was there all the time, longer than the BP spill,” said John Amos, founder and president of Sky Truth, a nonprofit organization that tracks pollution.

Under the Oil Pollution Act, companies are obligated to report hazardous spills to the NRC, which maintains a database of chemical pollution.

No law compels the companies or the federal government to raise public awareness, but the Clean Water Act clearly calls for citizen involvement.

Environmentalists took Taylor Energy to court.

In their lawsuit, the conservationists called the agreement between Taylor Energy and the federal government a secret deal “that was inconsistent with national policy.”

That policy, they argued, was made clear in the Clean Water Act, which mandates “public participation in the . . . enforcement of any regulation.” Citizen participation, the act says, “shall be provided for, encouraged and assisted.”

Taylor Energy and the Coast Guard – which is part of a Unified Command of federal agencies that includes the Interior Department, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency – did not live up to the policy. In fact, the public wasn’t made aware of the spill even after a private firm tested fish in the area and submitted an assessment to Taylor Energy in 2009 that said “there is an acceptable risk to humans if fish from the . . . area are consumed.”

“Taylor has failed to provide the public with information regarding the pace and extent of the oil leaks and Taylor’s efforts to control the leaks,” the lawsuit said.

It would take another three years before the government revealed an even deeper truth. Taylor Energy had been playing down the severity of the spill. An Associated Press investigation in 2015 determined that it was about 20 times worse than the company had reported.

Taylor Energy had argued that the leak was two gallons per day; the Coast Guard finally said it was 84 gallons or more, and was almost certainly coming from any of 16 wells.

“There’s a fine for not reporting, but none for underreporting,” Amos said. “If it’s only three gallons a day, who cares, that’s a trivial problem.”

– – –

Nearly a decade after the oil platform went down, the government determined that the actual level of oil leaking into the Gulf was between one and 55 barrels per day. Now, the new estimate dwarfs that: up to 700 barrels per day. Each barrel contains 42 gallons.

Despite that finding, NOAA is still in the early stages of a resource assessment of marine life that could explain the impact of the Taylor Energy spill, and is more than three years behind a deadline to issue a biological determination of the BP spill’s impact on marine life.

In July, Earthjustice, a nonprofit legal organization that represents conservation groups, sued NOAA for failing to produce a timely study.

Like Eustis, Amos said Atlantic coast residents should be wary. But in that region, where beaches and tourism enrich nearly every state, distrust over offshore leasing and drilling is bipartisan.

Governors, state lawmakers and attorneys general lashed out at the administration’s proposal. New Jersey passed a law that forbids oil and infrastructure in state waters three miles from shore, crippling any effort to run pipelines from platforms to the shore. Other states passed similar laws.

In the Carolinas, where Hurricane Florence’s winds topped 150 mph and produced a monster 83-foot wave as it neared landfall, governors who represent both political parties implored Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke to rethink the plan.

Meanwhile, in the Gulf, Taylor Energy was down to a single employee – its president, William Pecue.

At a 2016 public forum in Baton Rouge, Pecue made the case for allowing the company to walk away from its obligation to clean up the mess. Taylor Energy had been sold to a joint venture of South Korean companies in 2008, the same year it started the $666 million trust. A third of the money had been spent on cleanup, and only a third of the leaking wells had been fixed. But Pecue wanted to recover $450 million, arguing the spill could not be contained.

“I can affirmatively say that we do believe this was an act of God under the legal definition,” Pecue said. In other words, Taylor Energy had no control over the hurricane.

But Ivan was no freak storm.

It was one of more than 600 that have been tracked in the Gulf since records were kept in the mid-1800s, according to NOAA.

Fourteen years after the Taylor spill, and 10 years after the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the federal government still doesn’t know the spills’ full impact on marine life. And there is no economic analysis showing the value of the oil flowing into the sea and potential royalties lost to taxpayers. Activists also want an analysis to determine if oil is ruining marshland and making its way to beaches.

“Even though oil did not reach a lot of these beaches [during the BP spill], the fact that the public heard about it, it killed the beach economy for quite some time,” Sarthou said. “You don’t want to go to a beach with tar balls or oil washing up.”

At the time, Sarthou was unaware that Garcia-Pineda was conducting a study in the Gulf that would show the spill was far worse than imagined – up to 10 times worse than what the federal government was reporting.

As the saga in the Gulf plays out, wary officials on the Atlantic coast are anxiously watching President Donald Trump’s proposal to offer federal offshore leases.

It would take at least a decade for Atlantic drilling to start. The industry would first want to conduct seismic testing to determine the amount of oil and gas in the ground. Depending on the results, companies would bid for the leases. Interior has yet to approve seismic testing, which some studies say harms marine life, including large mammals such as dolphins and whales.

Oil and gas representatives say energy development off that coast could provide South Carolina with $2.7 billion in annual economic growth, 35,000 jobs and potentially lower heating costs for residents struggling to pay their bills.

During a federal informational hearing in South Carolina to explain the Trump administration’s plan in February, Mark Harmon, the director of a state unit of the American Petroleum Institute, stressed that point. “Ultimately, it means the potential for jobs and reinvestment in the community,” he said.

Once the oil industry gains a foothold in a region, it’s game over, said Chris Eaton, an Earthjustice attorney.

“A major part of the economy starts to change” as jobs with pay approaching $100,000 transform a tourism market to oil. “If it gets going, that train isn’t going to stop,” he said. “Let’s talk about what’s happening in the Gulf before we move into the Atlantic.”

 

Tampa Bay Times / Darryl Fears / October 22

 

Risk And Reform: Observing Effective Controls In Mexico’s Rapidly Transforming Energy Sector

Forbes / Armando Ortega / 11 Junio

 

MEXICO CITY—For decades, the most relevant compliance legislation for international companies operating in Mexico was the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Now, as a result of major national economic and legal reforms enacted during President Peña Nieto’s administration from 2012-2018, Mexico’s compliance environment has undergone a transformation. As foreign investment pours into Mexico’s recently opened oil and gas sector, legal entities are now criminally liable for any offenses or irregularities committed in their name, making the case for a robust compliance strategy that includes due diligence investigations into possible business partners.

A changing landscape: Mexico’s Energy Reform

Mexico enacted a historic reform program in December of 2013 that opened its oil and gas sector to foreign investment following 75 years of government ownership. Mexico’s energy reform plan was part of a broader, cross-sector effort by President Enrique Peña Nieto to boost the Mexican economy. Since its implementation, there have been three bidding rounds—the latest of which closed in March 2018—that have raised a total of $161.3 billion for investments that will take place until 2025. Fourteen percent of total investment is for public-private partnership projects between domestic and international companies and the Mexican state-owned oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex). With these investments, Pemex expects to significantly increase Mexico’s current production of 2 million barrels per day to a hypothetical 3.4 million barrels per day.

There is significant international interest in the process, with 34 companies securing bids. The US, with nine companies, and the UK, with four, lead the pack. Royal Dutch Shell, Qatar Petroleum, British Petroleum and Chevron are just a few of the major multinationals that have a stake in Mexico as a result of the energy reform.

Although significant opportunities are opening up in the sector, it is key that international investors understand the complexities involved with the energy reforms, as they are occurring amid a rapidly changing regulatory environment and era of overall reform resulting from the Peña Nieto years, and as part of a broader shift in sentiment among the Latin American public in the fight against corruption.

The National Anticorruption System and the new compliance environment

In what can be best understood as a citizens’ effort, a set of new legislative and constitutional reforms have been introduced in Mexico since May 2014, culminating in the establishment of the National Anticorruption System (SNA) in July 2016. The SNA is defined as a coordinating body between various institutions, including the Superior Audit of the Federation and the Federal Court of Administrative Justice, among others, to create mechanisms of collaboration and coordination to effectively prosecute corrupt practices.

The SNA is still in its early stages; a Specialized Prosecutor’s Office in Combating Corruption has yet to be properly established, and the Mexican Congress has yet to elect the Anticorruption Prosecutor. However, despite the lack of distinct progress, parts of the legal reforms introduced to create the SNA already have far-reaching implications.

 

Forbes / Armando Ortega / 11 Junio

 

 

 

¿Participarás en consorcio con otras empresas en las Rondas de Licitación de CNH? Conoce de qué se trata la Responsabilidad Solidaria.

En 2014, México promulgó  la Reforma Energética y con ello abrió paso a un hecho histórico, por vez primera en 75 años se permitió a la inversión privada participar en las actividades de Exploración y Extracción de hidrocarburos.

Las empresas y consorcios  interesados en participar en los concursos de licitación organizados por la Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos (CNH) lo pueden hacer como licitante individual o licitante agrupado (consorcio). Aquellos que deciden participar como consorcio no están obligados constituir una nueva persona moral, sino simplemente a manifestar su voluntad de presentar una propuesta conjunta para la licitación y firmar el contrato correspondiente.

Al permitir este tipo de agrupación, se pretende promover la participación del mayor número de empresas  sin que se quede fuera el capital mexicano. Por eso, pueden licitar empresas que cuenten con experiencia y comprueben capacidad técnica (como operadores) -requisitos que en su mayoría van a cubrir empresas extranjeras- y empresas con capacidad económica y financiera (no operadores).

La participación en consorcio permite que las empresas reúnan las condiciones, que en conjunto  les aseguren mayores posibilidades de éxito. No obstante, es importante considerar que en cualquier caso las empresas adquieren una responsabilidad total solidaria  por las actividades que se ejecuten en el campo.

En primer lugar, será necesario definir su porcentaje de participación, lo cual no implica que asuman solamente en esa medida las obligaciones  establecidas en el contrato, pues las empresas participantes serán solidariamente responsables de todas y cada una de las obligaciones que asume el consorcio, independientemente de su porcentaje de su respectiva participación.

El operador, por su parte, tiene la obligación de cumplir con las obligaciones del contrato en representación de las empresas participantes. Específicamente, se encarga de todos los aspectos operacionales, pero en caso de algún incumplimiento de su parte, como ya dijimos no releva de su responsabilidad solidaria a las otras empresas.

La figura del operador es central, por eso se requiere que cuente por lo menos con una tercera parte de la participación en el consorcio y ningún otro miembro podrá tener una participación económicamente  mayor a  la suya.

En materia de seguros, por ejemplo, el operador es responsable de contratarlos y presentarlos ante la Agencia de Seguridad, Energía y Ambiente (ASEA), de conformidad con lo establecido en las Disposiciones Administrativas de Carácter General   en materia de Seguros (DAGS] para las actividades de Exploración y Extracción de Hidrocarburos, pero si en el momento de un siniestro las coberturas no fueran suficientes y/o adecuadas para responder por el daño, todos los participantes serán legalmente responsables de repararlo.

En NRGI Broker, somos expertos en materia de seguros, así como de la regulación en  materia ambiental, con la que deben cumplir los operadores petroleros. Acércate a nosotros, con gusto te atenderemos.